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Regulation is intended to protect the vulnerable.  However, 
in its present form the unintended consequences of the 
proposed Volcker Rule has the potential of continuing the 
liquidity crisis that aided in the degradation of the housing 
market into decreased liquidity in the capital markets.  In 
addition to increasing costs to the investor and decreasing 
market efficiency from increased bid ask price spreads, the 
proposed rule will transfer risk to less regulated financial 
institutions as new hedge funds open.  The risk can have a 
profound impact on the retirement community through 
underfunded pension funds searching for absolute returns.  
Another unintended consequence of the proposed Volcker 
Rule is how the rule may place banks conducting business in 
the United States or with United States “residents” at a 
competitive disadvantage due to lost revenues combined 
with the high cost of compliance.  The rule has the potential 
to cause United States banks and businesses to be at a 
competitive disadvantage in global markets. 
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ABSTRACT 
Regulation is intended to protect the vulnerable.  However, in its present form the unintended 
consequences of the proposed Volcker Rule has the potential of continuing the liquidity crisis that aided 
in the degradation of the housing market into decreased liquidity in the capital markets.  In addition to 
increasing costs to the investor and decreasing market efficiency from increased bid ask price spreads, 
the proposed rule will transfer risk to less regulated financial institutions as new hedge funds open.  The 
risk can have a profound impact on the retirement community through underfunded pension funds 
searching for absolute returns.  Another unintended consequence of the proposed Volcker Rule is how 
the rule may place banks conducting business in the United States or with United States “residents” at a 
competitive disadvantage due to lost revenues combined with the high cost of compliance.  The rule has 
the potential to cause United States banks and businesses to be at a competitive disadvantage in global 
markets. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The prohibited practice of proprietary trading and the allowed practice of market making will be 
discussed in the first section.  The proposed Volcker Rule will have the effect of decreasing revenue while 
simultaneously increasing costs for compliance.  The capacity to compete in the global markets for 
covered banking entities and for U.S. businesses will decline. 
Relationships with hedge funds and private equity funds are discussed in the second section.  Risk is 
transferring from the more regulated banking entities to the less regulated asset managers and insurance 
companies.  Herding may be a reason for concern, as well as the transfer of risk that will place many, 
including vulnerable retirees, at increased risk.  Pension funds are underfunded and are investing in 
hedge funds for absolute returns. 
 
PROPRIETARY TRADING AND MARKET MAKING 
The Volcker Rule 
The proposed Volcker Rule consists of 298 pages.  A complete copy of the draft of the rule released by 
the Federal Reserve can be located online.  The rule’s official name is “Prohibitions And Restrictions On 
Proprietary Trading And Certain Interests In, And Relationships With, Hedge Funds And Private Equity 
Funds” (Federal Reserve, 2011).  It has been named the Volcker Rule after the former Federal Reserve 
Chairman, Paul Volcker (Mehta, 2011).   
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The Volcker Rule draft that was released on October 11, 2011 has two main prohibitions.  First, the rule 
“prohibits [federally] insured depository institutions, bank holding companies, and their subsidiaries or 
affiliates (banking entities)from engaging in short-term proprietary trading of any security, derivative, and 
certain other financial instruments for a banking entity’s own account, subject to certain exemptions.  
Second, it prohibits owning, sponsoring, or having certain relationships with, a hedge fund or private 
equity fund, subject to certain exemptions,” (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2011). 
The first purpose of the proposed Volcker Rule is to protect customers from losing their deposits through 
the financial firm’s trading that involves risk for the firm’s own benefit.  This type of trading is known as 
proprietary trading.  The second purpose is to lessen systemic risk within the financial system.   
Proprietary Trading is defined in the Financial Dictionary by Farlex (2011); “Proprietary trading (also "prop 
trading") occurs when a firm trades stocks, bonds, currencies, commodities, their derivatives, or other 
financial instruments, with the firm's own money as opposed to its customers' money, so as to make a 
profit for itself.”   
Market making provides liquidity in the markets and increases market efficiency.  The definition of market 
making by Farlex provides further insight into how difficult it can be to identify the difference between 
proprietary trading and market making.  A market maker is, “a dealer available to trade a stated security 
on its own account at any time at the quoted price. The job of a dealer is to be a market maker in order to 
promote liquidity for a security. When a broker-dealer makes a market, it trades from its own inventory, 
which is easier and less expensive for an investor than looking for other brokerages willing to trade. Many 
exchanges designate a market maker for each of its listed securities to promote ease of trade.  Market 
makers improve the efficiency of markets by quoting both bid and ask prices of an asset.”  
A debate is forming in the public sector regarding the unintended consequences of the rule.  The draft is 
open for public comment on the Federal Reserve’s web site until January 13, 2012 (Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System, 2011).  Whether or not the regulation is finalized, the statutory Volcker Rule 
prohibitions will go into effect on July 21, 2012 (Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, 2011). 
Decreased Revenues 
The intended results and the unintended consequences of the proposed rule follow Newton’s well-known 
third law, “For every action there is an equal and opposite reaction.”  Integrated into the Volcker Rule, 
without specific comment, are the consequences of decreasing revenue while simultaneously increasing 
costs.   
The loss in annual revenues by financial institutions affected by the rule will be significant.  Patterson and 
Zibel (2011) quote analyst estimates of $2 billion in lost revenue.  The removal of the source of revenue is 
occurring at a time when banks are already under pressure from substantial costs and weak growth.   
Touryalai (2011, Oct 7) provides partial details of revenues at risk.  Goldman Sachs’ has 48 percent 
principal trading revenue at risk, although the Nomura analyst Glenn Schorr is quoted as saying the rule 
will impact 20 percent, which is still a substantial loss of revenue.  Morgan Stanley will also feel the effect 
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of the rule with up to 27 percent of its principal trading revenue at risk.   Bank of America has 9 percent at 
risk, JPMorgan Chase has 8 percent at risk, and Citigroup has 5 percent at risk.   
Nomura’s analyst, Schorr provides clarity to unintended consequences of the rule in his following 
statement, “A draconian form of the Volcker Rule will likely have unintended consequences, such as 
reduced liquidity, higher funding costs for U.S. companies, less credit for small businesses, higher trading 
costs and lower investor returns, less ability to transfer risk, and competitive disadvantages for U.S. banks 
relative to foreign banks. We are hopeful regulators are mindful of these risks and doing their best to 
write fair, yet effective, rules.” (Touryalai, 2011 October 7). 
Increased Costs 
Costs will be increased by the Volcker Rule, knocking the revenue and cost equation further out of 
balance during a weak recovery.  Tourlyalai (2011, Oct 12) quotes Frank Keating, president of The 
American Banker Association (ABA): 
“Only in today’s regulatory climate could such a simple idea become so complex, 
generating a rule whose preamble alone is 215 pages, with 381 footnotes to boot. 
How can banks comply with a rule that complicated, and how can regulators 
effectively administer it in a way that doesn’t make it harder for banks to serve their 
customers and further weaken the broader economy? 
It’s clear from the proposal that many important details remain unresolved. More 
questions are asked than answered, with requests for public comment on 394 
specific issues. The exceedingly high number of unanswered questions betrays the 
frustration regulators are having as they come to grips with the complexity of the 
concepts behind the Volcker Rule when applied to reality. Regulators will be working 
on these practical questions for a long time to come…Regulators’ own estimates 
indicate banks will have to spend nearly 6.6 million hours to implement the rule, of 
which more than 1.8 million hours would be required every year in perpetuity. That 
translates into 3,292 years, or more than 3,000 bank employees whose sole job will 
be complying with this rule. They will be transferred to a role that provides no 
customer service, generates zero revenue and does nothing for the economy.” 
The government estimates that the cost for compliance and capital to banking entities covered by the 
rule will only reach $1 billion.  However, the office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) estimates the 
cost of capital alone will reach $917 million (Brush, 2011).   
Many consider these estimates to be low.  Donald Lamson who once worked for the OCC as assistant 
director and is now a Washington-based counsel at Shearman & Sterling also believes the government’s 
calculation is too low.  Lamson emphasized the miscalculation of the cost associated with the rule by 
stating, “There are a number of costs associated with this and I think the rulemaking and official 
government assessments understate the costs,” (Brush, 2011).   
Schorr estimates the cost to the industry for compliance and monitoring will reach $2.1 billion each year 
(Mehta, 2011).  After adding this cost to the $2 billion in lost revenues and before considering the impact 
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of increased capital requirements, the annual impact of the rule is estimated at $4.1 billion – during a 
weak economy. 
When the proposed application of the rule is reviewed, the reason for the higher estimates for the cost of 
compliance is clear.  Regulatory agencies suggest using 17 metrics in the process for determining if a bank 
has engaged in market making or in the prohibited practice of proprietary trading (Mehta, 2011, Oct 16).  
Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP Law Firm (Davis, Polk & Wardwell, 2011) created a series of flowcharts to 
explain the Volcker rule.  The flowchart that demonstrates the complex metrics used to determine the 
difference between market making and proprietary trading can be found in Appendix A.   
Mehta (2011) writes in her article about the additional costs that will be incurred by the need to hire new 
compliance employees.  Daily calculations running the 17 metrics will be required of firms with more than 
$5 billion in trading assets and liabilities.  The results are to be reported to regulators monthly.  Thirteen 
firms fall into this category and account for 98.4 percent of the trading assets and liabilities of the 1,020 
bank holding companies that are to be regulated by the rule.  One compliance person will be required in 
each subsidiary and trading unit to meet the required monitoring for the rule.  Each bank may have a 
multiple of a dozen trading units.  To comply with the rule, a multiple of a dozen additional jobs in the 
compliance division would be required. 
Middle sized banks will be required to measure eight of the seventeen metrics, and the small sized banks 
will be exempt.  The smaller scale would make the costs prohibitive for the added monitoring. 
Impact on Investors from Decreased Market Making Activity 
The impact of the Volcker Rule will not be limited to banking entities.  Investors will be impacted with a 
meaningful unintended consequence if the rule is applied too restrictively regarding proprietary trading 
and market making.  Liquidity will leave the markets due to the rule’s lack of clarity. 
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) defines itself as an advocate for investors that 
maintains fair markets and, most importantly regarding the Volcker Rule, it proactively addresses 
“emerging regulatory issues before they harm investors or the markets,” (FINRA, 2011).  Thomas Gira, 
Executive Vice President of FINRA is quoted by Mehta (2011) as saying the Volcker Rule has the “potential 
to impact legitimate activity,” and that what constitutes market making is a “difficult question to get your 
arms around.  From a surveillance standpoint, this is a pretty challenging rule,” (Mehta, 2011).  
Jamie Dimon, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of JPMorgan described the importance of banks 
acting as market makers for investors during a conference call; “The United States has the best, deepest, 
widest, and the most transparent capital markets in the world, which give you, the investor, the ability to 
buy and sell large amounts at very cheap prices.  That’s a good thing.  I wish Paul Volcker understood 
that.”  (Mehta, 2011).   
David A. Viniar, Chief Financial Officer of Goldman Sachs, and James Gorman, Chief Executive Officer of 
Morgan Stanley, are shutting down their proprietary trading divisions in compliance with the rule.  They 
too, are concerned about losing capacity for making markets and warn that if the Volcker Rule is 
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interpreted too strictly, banking entities will see their capacity for market making reduced.  The investor 
will ultimately feel the impact when market liquidity is reduced (Brush, Harper, & Moore, 2011). 
Lost Capacity for Banks and Businesses to Compete 
Another meaningful unintended consequence of the proposed rule is how it will decrease 
competitiveness by all entities impacted within its scope.  The proposed rule will give the advantage to 
foreign banks that will not have any involvement with United States financial services covered by the rule.  
Peter Nerby, a Moody’s Investors Service analyst, observes that, “The rule disadvantages the important 
core market-making franchises of the big United States banks and creates opportunities for unregulated 
competitors, such as high-frequency trading firms, and the non-United States operations of foreign 
banks,” (Panchuk, 2011). 
While speaking on a panel hosted by New York University’s Stern School of Business in September, the 
chief executive officer of JPMorgan’s investment bank, James (Jes) Staley commented on the regulators’ 
observance when the Volcker Rule was first introduced.  He said assurances were made that other 
countries “would fall in line, but we haven’t seen that.  Germany, France, China, Brazil.  They didn’t follow 
us,” (Touryalai, Oct 12).   
The rule covers all banking entities that fit the guidelines, whether they are United States owned or 
foreign owned, and its scope continues beyond the shores of the United States.  Landy (2011) 
summarizes how the rule expands its jurisdiction into other countries.  First, to avoid impact from the 
rule, no party to a trade may be a United States “resident,” which includes United States companies.  
Second, no person in the United States may be directly involved in the trade, including employees of non-
American banks that are operating within the country.  If any of the conditions exist, the banking entity 
must comply with the proposed Volcker Rule, whether domestically owned or foreign owned. 
The third part of Landy’s summary states that to avoid falling under regulation by the Volcker Rule, a 
trade must be “executed wholly” outside of the United States.  No part of a trade may be executed by any 
banking entity, clearinghouse, stock exchange, or any other entity that is a part of the United States 
financial system.   
The last point of Landy’s summary is that if the banking entity falls within the scope of the rule, every 
trade must be proven to comply through documenting, reporting, internal controls, and certifications.  
These restrictions will cause jobs to leave the country as foreign owned banks move their offices and 
branches out of the United States. 
In addition to causing jobs to leave the United States, competitiveness of United States companies will 
decrease in the global markets due to the higher costs associated with financing.  It can be concluded that 
given the high costs associated with compliance with the Volcker Rule, rather than adding new, non-
revenue producing jobs to enforce the United States rule, foreign banks may elect to avoid working with 
United States customers.  At minimum, the cost of credit will increase substantially.  An example that 
points to this conclusion is how difficult it would be for European banks to absorb the lost revenues and 
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increased costs from the proposed rule during the financial and euro crisis currently taking place in the 
European Union.   
If enforced, the proposed rule will place United States banks as well as United States businesses at a 
distinct disadvantage while competing in the global markets.  The competition in the global markets will 
shift away from United States banking entities and companies.  
Proprietary Traders Exiting Investment Banks 
The Volcker Rule is causing more jobs than those in foreign owned banks and their subsidiaries to leave 
the United States.  A consequence of the proposed Volcker Rule is that prop traders are leaving the 
larger, more regulated banking entities to open new hedge funds in smaller, less regulated financial 
institutions that may or may not be in the United States.  (Major Trends, 2011).  Some of the exiting prop 
traders and hedge fund managers are moving offshore, often to Asia, and taking their talents and skills in 
creating wealth with them.  Those who remain will have the added hurdle of competing with the offshore 
talent in international markets.   
To understand the implications of the relocation of skills and talents to independent wealth managers, 
private asset managers, or insurance companies, the difference between a prop trader and hedge fund 
manager should be understood.  While both prop traders and hedge fund managers are experienced with 
managing large amounts of capital, a bank prop trader has a different focus regarding capital and risk.  
Prop traders do not view capital as a tightly fixed amount (Analysis, 2011). They have an investment 
“credit line” financed through the bank’s balance sheet.  By contrast, private asset managers and 
independent hedge fund managers are not a division in a larger entity with a larger balance sheet.  Their 
capital is limited to the balance sheet of the assets they manage from day-to-day. 
The second difference between prop trading and managing a hedge fund is the amount of cash 
maintained (Analysis).  Prop traders can take more risk by working with minimal cash.  Hedge fund 
managers maintain a certain amount of cash in preparation for customer redemptions.  The higher 
percentage of cash balance reduces the amount of risk in the fund. 
The third difference between prop trading and managing a hedge fund is diversification (Analysis).  An 
individual prop trader can specialize in a single type of asset.  Diversification is not a focus for an 
individual prop trader.  It is established through the combination of the trading activities of the multiple 
prop traders in the banking entity who each specialize their area of asset classes.  By contrast, a hedge 
fund manager is required to provide diversification within the fund.  Diversification within a fund can 
decrease the amount of investible capital that can be used to manage risk while unwinding a position.  
The differences between prop trading and hedge fund management lead to different risk management 
structures.  The example set by MF Global Holdings, Ltd., which would not have been covered under the 
Volcker Rule, emphasizes the magnitude of the impact of the different risk management techniques that 
can result.  Ultimately, the risk is transferred to the investor when losses are incurred from the failure of 
the smaller financial institution.   
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Following is a summary of events that led up to the filing for bankruptcy by MF Global.  The summary 
provides insight into what can occur when risk is transferred by the Volcker Rule from large banking 
entities that build internal controls to disperse risk, to the more vulnerable segments of the financial 
system that do not have the capacity to control large amounts of risk.   
Carney (2011) describes events that lead to MF Global’s filing for bankruptcy.  After constructing what is 
traditionally viewed as a low risk “repo-to-maturity” trade of European debt with capital owned by the 
firm, the risk suddenly increased as the value of the bonds decreased.  A circle of events resulted.   
Regulators required more capital in preparation for probable margin calls, as well as the disclosure of the 
size of position.  After learning the size of position and the higher risk due to the lower value of the 
bonds, ratings agencies issued downgrades of MF Global’s credit, which in turn led to further creditor 
calls for additional collateral.   
 
HEDGE FUNDS 
Impact on Private Banking Wealth Management 
In his video produced by Kantola (2008), Jay Conger quoted a person he identified as a private banking 
executive for a large Swiss bank.  The executive positioned the division’s attitude toward competition 
with the statement, “You are about to lose every second customer.”  His words show how essential it is to 
compete to gain every new client that has an interest in investment and private banking, and to maintain 
a secure relationship with every one of the division’s established clients. 
In response to the Volcker Rule, Private banking divisions may consider that statement to be more than a 
mere positioning of attitude.  It may become reality, especially regarding their high net worth clients that 
provide a large percentage of a bank’s private investment capital.  Rather than invest their wealth with 
private banking, they may move it to a private hedge fund, or they may open a family office.  Families 
with $100 million or more have been increasingly trending toward opening independent offices.  The 
lesser known method for managing wealth was first initiated when John D. Rockefeller’s family office was 
opened in 1882 to manage the family’s assets.  With the introduction of the Volcker Rule, this lesser 
known method is becoming more widely implemented.  A downside to the investor is that costs are 
increased with the smaller scale of the family office. 
The opening of smaller scale and new hedge funds is transferring risk from more regulated entities to less 
regulated entities.  The new hedge funds are not subject to the more rigorous regulations to which the 
covered financial entities must adhere.  Consequently, investors are placing their wealth at a greater risk 
of loss in an environment that has less rigorous regulations. 
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Herding 
To effectively manage or regulate systemic risk, it is essential to first understand the two channels 
through which the risk can occur, the direct channel and the indirect channel.  King and Maier (2007) 
provide the following analysis of the two channels: 
“A direct channel occurs when a collapse of a hedge fund (or group of hedge funds) 
holding large positions leads to forced liquidations of those positions at fire-sale 
prices.  The impact on asset prices may be amplified through the use of leverage – 
whether created directly through the use of margin or indirectly through the 
embedded leverage of derivative positions. Such a disorderly unwinding, it is feared, 
could generate heavy losses to counterparties and ultimately contribute to severe 
financial distress at one or more systematically important financial institutions. 
 
In the indirect channel, a forced hedge fund liquidation exacerbates market volatility 
and reduces liquidity in key markets. Systemic risk can occur when correlations in 
asset classes increase during times of stress, or when the potential for herding 
amplifies market movements.” 
 
King and Maier (2007) caution that systemic risk increases when economies and markets experience 
increased stress.  The correlation between asset classes increases, and hedge fund trades herd together - 
amplifying market movements.  If a large enough number of hedge funds unknowingly herd together in a 
trade because it makes sense given market conditions, market volatility increases as does the potential 
for systemic risk with increased price movement.  Tail risk events are occurring more frequently, again 
increasing the potential for systemic risk through herding.   
The Volcker Rule does not address the potential for systemic risk from the domino effect of hedge funds 
and broker-dealers.  As more independent hedge funds open due to the exit of traders and managers 
from the banking entities covered by the Volcker Rule, the phenomenon of herding should be taken into 
consideration.  When herding occurs, the sum of the parts can add up to a systemically meaningful whole. 
Risk Transferred to the Vulnerable 
 
The Volcker Rule prohibiting banking entities from owning more than three percent in a hedge fund or 
private equity fund.  One of the effects is to ultimately transfer the risk from the financial sector to 
vulnerable segments of the population, one of which is the current and future retirees through their 
dependence on pension funds. 
There is a large dislocation in funding of pension funds that is driving the funds to increase investment in 
hedge funds to capture the absolute returns.  In the White Paper, “Major Trends Occurring in 2011: 
Implications for Hedge Funds / Funds of Funds,” Infovest 21 (2011) writes about the increasing demand 
by pension funds that are underfunded.  At year-end 2010, Standard & Poor’s estimated the amount of 
combined underfunding to be $315 billion for 1500 of the largest United States pension funds.  In 2010, 
corporate pension funds were funded at average to 81 percent, and state and local funds were funded at 
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average to only 79 percent.  Infovest21 further defined the lack of performance in pension funds that 
invested in the S&P 500, which had a return of only 0.4 percent during the ten years from 2000 to 2010.   
With the Volcker Rule prohibiting prop trading and more than three percent ownership in hedge funds, 
the best and the brightest traders and managers are exiting the banks to manage hedge funds 
independently or within financial entities not covered by the rule.  They will not be met with the 
regulatory concerns arising from the Volcker Rule, including limits on compensation (Major Trends, 2011).   
There are two issues that arise from the relocation of talent.   
The first issue is that many of the skilled and talented prop traders do not have experience with running a 
business.  The business activities that were segregated into separate departments of the bank suddenly 
become a part of the trader’s daily schedule when running a hedge fund outside of the banking entity 
(Major Trends).  Higher costs are associated with the administrative duties of a hedge fund office.  
Commentary from a law firm in the “Major Trends Occurring in 2011” White Paper by Infovest21 provides 
perspective on the different requirements of a hedge fund that is managed outside of a banking entity.  
The law firm recommends: 
“that managers adopt articulate FCPA (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977) 
compliance policies and procedures, establish oversight by senior executives with 
responsibility for compliance policy implementation and review, require annual 
certification and regular training, establish procedures for entering into a third party 
business relationship, create a reporting system to ensure that violations can be 
promptly detected and remedied, set up accounting procedures and controls to 
ensure accurate accounting and books and records, and have independent audits 
conducted.” 
The broker-dealer MF Global provides an example of what can happen when accounting books and 
records are not accurate.  Inaccurate accounting methods brought negotiations for a merger with other 
broker-dealers to a halt.  MF Global was rapidly searching for a buyer with a larger balance sheet that 
could absorb the risk; however, each broker-dealer considering the merger stated they backed away after 
analyzing the books.  The statement was made by one broker-dealer that it could not “get a good sense 
of what was on the balance sheet,” (Lucchetti & Patterson, 2011).   
The only action remaining for MF Global was to file for bankruptcy.  The events surrounding the filing 
support the statement made by Pirrong, a finance professor specializing in risk management at the 
University of Houston.  Mehta (2011) quotes Pirrong; “You think you’re reducing risk but you’re shifting it 
around in ways that can come back and bite you.  Customers will go to other financial entities. (The 
Volcker Rule) doesn’t make the problems go away.  It just changes the location.”  When herding is taken 
into consideration, Pirrong’s statement regarding the shifting of risk becomes even more deeply 
concerning. 
At the time of the writing of this paper, $600 million of MF Global’s customer money cannot be found.  In 
the article written by Lucchetti and Patterson (2011), a regulator with the Commodity Futures Trading 
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Commission (CFTC) stated that ten days out from the initial bankruptcy filing, the numbers are not 
leading the regulators to the customers’ money due to the condition of the accounting books.     
Prior to the Volcker Rule, concern over customer money prompted some banking entities to construct a 
“fund of one,” (Major Trends, 2011).  In response to the fraud from Madoff, private wealth divisions were 
increasing their due diligence teams and creating new products.  The fund of one was a new product that 
was constructed with the investment from a single customer.  The customer might be an individual, a 
pension fund, or another type of investor.  A feature of the fund of one is that it eliminates the 
opportunity for the Ponzi scheme fraud committed by Madoff.   
There are hurdles for smaller financial institutions that would consider offering the fund of one financial 
product.  It can be cost prohibitive with the extra accounting, compliance and administration required, 
which makes it less attractive to hedge fund managers outside of investment banks.  Another hurdle is 
the management of risk within the fund.  Prop traders and fund managers are talented and skilled in their 
areas of specialization; however, their risk management skills were sharpened with a balance sheet that 
could absorb a greater amount of risk.   
With its ties to Goldman Sachs talent, MF Global is an example of the difference in risk management 
techniques of a more constrained, broker-dealer balance sheet as compared to the larger investment 
bank balance sheet of Goldman Sachs.  The relatively conservative risk management technique that 
matched the smaller MF Global balance sheet was ratcheted up by talent learned at the Goldman Sachs 
investment bank.  A higher tolerance for risk had been learned while working with a much larger balance 
sheet (Brush, Harper & Moore, 2011).  The trade that had been thought to involve low risk suddenly 
altered into a trade that involved too much risk for the smaller balance sheet of the broker-dealer.  
Where MF Global declared bankruptcy, Goldman Sachs more than likely would have had the capacity to 
manage the risk through additional hedging while unwinding the position. 
Smaller banking entities with smaller balance sheets, as well as retirees, are more susceptible to risk.  The 
Oregon public pension fund was invested in a fund that had been built to $7 billion and then used to 
invest in MF Global.  The fund is down 60 percent (Erman, 2011).   
When pension funds could invest in hedge funds managed by banks, they had the additional assurance of 
the bank performing due diligence to decrease the likelihood of fraud.  With the prohibition in the 
Volcker Rule, pension funds along with all other investors in hedge funds, will have to rely on their 
independent due diligence while researching the fund manager’s competency and legitimacy.  
Competency and legitimacy are difficult to determine due to the trading strategies that are unique to 
hedge funds.  The funds are not readily transparent.  If one fund’s position and strategy is made known, 
another fund may take the opposite side, diminishing or eliminating the opportunity to make a return or 
potentially causing a loss. 
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Self-Imposed Reduction of Risk 
The financial system has been actively working to reduce the amount of systemic risk since 2007.  Tim 
Ryan, President and Chief Executive Officer of Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 
(SIFMA) included the following quote in his opening remarks for the annual SIFMA meeting held 
November 7, 2011: 
 “Since the end of 2007, U.S. financial firms have raised more than $300 
billion of common equity. The largest U.S. banks have reduced their average leverage 
ratio from 16:1 to 11:1 and increased loan loss reserves by about 200%. Off-balance 
sheet activity has also been reduced dramatically. Many have already undergone 
stress tests with both the Treasury and Fed. Over 90 percent of the TARP capital 
infusion funds into banks have already been repaid, with interest, dividend and 
warrant sales for a profit of $19 billion to the taxpayers to date.” 
 “At SIFMA, we have been focused from the very early days of regulatory 
reform on being productive participants in the process. Through our committees, on 
which almost 6,000 members from the industry participate, we provide information 
and analysis to help the regulators craft rules that work and create certainty. We 
support measures to restore faith and confidence in our financial system, such as 
establishing a systemic risk regulator and the designation of bank and non-bank firms 
as systemically important. We believe there should be a uniform fiduciary standard of 
care. We support risk retention and other improvements in the securitization space 
to help jumpstart recovery of the housing market. But we cannot support measures 
which disrupt market functions or increase systemic risk, ultimately failing to achieve 
what Congress and the Administration sought to accomplish with this legislation.” 
Capitalism is strengthened by competition.  If a business practice does not support the company’s 
sustainability, the company will take action to correct the practice.  The financial industry is implementing 
the changed practices as noted in Tim Ryan’s statement to decrease systemic risk.  This will increase the 
sustainability of banking entities and of the financial system. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Intended results of the proposed Volcker Rule are to reduce risk of lost investor deposits and to reduce 
systemic risk in the financial system.  However, the magnitude of the impact caused by the unintended 
consequences may derail the intended results. 
In its current form, the proposed rule lacks clarity between prohibited proprietary trading and allowed 
market making activities.  As covered banking entities end prop trading, they may also decrease market 
making due to a lack of clear definition.  The result will be less liquidity in the markets, a larger bid ask 
price spread, and less market efficiency. All of these consequences of the proposed Volcker Rule will 
increase costs for investors.   
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Further effects of the proposed Volcker Rule are to lose jobs in the United States and to decrease 
revenue while also significantly increasing costs of compliance for banks.   These events are occurring at a 
time when the banking entities are recovering from the recent financial crisis, and when economic 
recovery has been slow. 
The increase in required bureaucracy and the high costs associated with compliance with the Volcker Rule 
have the potential to cause foreign banks to cease conducting business within the United States and to 
avoid working with United States customers.  Either the revenues generated from the transactions will 
not cover the costs and the associated bureaucracy, or the United States customer will pay substantially 
higher costs for the financial service.  If enforced, the proposed rule will place United States banks as well 
as United States companies at a disadvantage while competing in the global markets. 
Investment by banking entities covered by the proposed Volcker Rule in hedge funds and private equity 
funds is limited to 3 percent.  Risk is transferring from regulated banking entities to less regulated asset 
managers and insurance companies.  Prop traders are exiting investment banks to open new hedge 
funds, and banking entities are exiting their prohibited ownership or relationships with hedge funds.   
Pension funds that are underfunded are increasing their search for absolute returns generated by hedge 
funds and returns from private equity funds.  The unintended consequence of reducing systemic risk in 
banking entities will be the transfer of risk to relatively unregulated financial asset management entities 
and the vulnerable current and future retirees through underfunded pension funds. 
In divergence from the Volcker Rule, rather than prohibit prop trading, banks should be regulated to limit 
prop trading to tier one capital.  Two objectives would be met with the implementation of this type of 
regulation.  Customer deposits would be protected from prop trading activities, and banks would not be 
unduly concerned about how the regulatory agencies would interpret their market making activities.  
Banks would self-regulate tier one capital prop trading to protect dividend payouts to their investors.  
Market liquidity would not be negatively impacted by regulation.  Investors would benefit through a more 
competitive investment environment that would maintain market liquidity and lower costs. 
Rather than severely limit regulated banking entity ownership or relationships with hedge funds and 
private equity funds, systemic risk can be reduced by lowering the amount of leverage allowed to 
generate the absolute return.  The future and current retirees depending on pension funds will benefit 
from the increased competition between banking entities with larger balance sheets within an 
investment environment that is more carefully regulated. 
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